In an article posted today at eWeek, AT&T is excused from its traditional role as scapegoat in the Google Voice rejection fiasco.  And my previously posted sentiments about Apple building something that competes with Google Voice have finally been echoed on a mainstream outlet.

Well doy, Apple realizes that consumer-empowering voice technology is a competitive advantage.  We VoIP folks have been preaching that gospel for the last ten years.  Comrade Ken Camp wrote with visionary accuracy about the merits of VoIP in his book IP Telephony Demystified, one of the really early books on the subject.  I agreed with him when I wrote Switching to VoIP that VoIP is a leveler of the playing field, a true equalizer and a legitimately revolutionary technology item.

I’ve also viewed carriers like AT&T, at least for the last four or five years, as access providers, not “phone line providers” offering dialtone.  Apple, it seems, has arrived at the same conclusion.

First, it’s not the FCC’s domain but the Federal Trade Commission’s domain whether or not a business practice, like Apple’s (admittedly inconsistent) enforcement of it’s own developer agreements, is an unfair trade practice. And it may well be unfair; that doesn’t make it within the jurisdiction of the FCC, whose stock and trade isn’t social progress or anti-collusion.  Clearly, those are business matters whose definition of justice has little or nothing to do with voice as an application.  We have to be careful not to push the social progress agenda too hard–especially to the extend that we’re routinely punishing those who are earning a great profit, vis-a-vis Apple and the iPhone.

Second, let’s ask the real question: Since we know the decision to allow Google Voice is ultimately up to Apple, and not AT&T, what could Apple’s motivation for this rejection possibly be?  Are we ignoring the simple answer?  Enhancements to the iChat ecosystems, perhaps? The most obvious answer may not satisfy the conspiracy theorists.  But something as easy as Apple is getting ready to release their own Voice-killer makes the most since to me, to heck with AT&T’s bandwidth.

Finally, I’ve almost concluded that AT&T’s days as the exclusive distributor of iPhones in North America are numbered. Apple would have to score a pretty low IQ to permanently marry their network support to a single carrier, with the rise of new wide-area wireless networking standards and mass WiFi addiction marching on with no favoritism towards Bell.  This would seem to indicate, at least out here in the “sensible” midwest, that Apple is not beholden to AT&T, a company short on both sexy intellectual property and an applications-oriented revenue model, for a short-term political favor that screws its relationship with Google, a company who is enriched of both.

The answer to this mystery, I believe, is in Cupertino.

If Apple insists on barring developers who overlap the “built-in functionality” of the iPhone, how is a developer to know what types of applications are a safe bet–in the long run? Since Apple recently banished Google Voice from the app store (which is an epic fail on Apple’s part, btw), one has to wonder, since all apps borrow some of Apple’s API functionality, just what they consider built-in and not.

The article, Apple Makes the Case for Web Apps concludes that developers will be more inclined to  create web-based apps geared at the iPhone.  While Apple’s recent actions may give developers pause to consider the web approach, I disagree that many will abandon their native app inclinations because of all that they lose in doing so.  For one, you can’t create home screen shortcuts to web apps (that I know of).  But the best reason not to develop web apps for the iPhone is their lack of support for front-end controls on the phone itself.  That is, in a web app, you don’t have nearly the power to access the GPS location, the GUI controls, the iPod library,  and so on. The new 3.0 iPhone browser is better at hooking into the phone’s local hardware, but is still quite hobbled compare to native apps, so geolocation and photos won’t have the pinache they would on a native app. Those are the content items that have made iPhone apps so much better than previous-generation mobile apps, and with the web approach, they’re more or less off limits.

How is it that YellowPages.com can offer a directory lookup app on the app store when it obviously overlaps Apple’s built-in Contacts and Maps functionality?  Yet instead of picking on YellowPages.com, Apple is seen picking on Google, arguably their biggest and most powerful ally.  Add to that the insult of Apple’s marketing of the iPhone and iPod Touch to developers as a platform for great apps, and it should make us all feel a bit used.

In the heady days of the computer revolution, Microsoft was forced to recognize that Windows (even MS-DOS) was a platform. Rather than stifling upstart competition by barring certain developers from the Windows ecosystem, Microsoft at least realized that it was developer embrace of the platform that would cause it to live or die in the long run.  The result was that, through the early 2000′s, Windows was the go-to platform for the whole world, and everybody from Sun to IBM lost lengthy, futile, billion dollar battles trying to undo Microsoft’s early decision.

Apple is nearly past that point in their new platform’s life cycle.  If it’s an app platform–let it be.  Palm and Blackberry are still waiting in the wings, and Windows Mobile will be the centerpiece of Microsoft’s revenue strategy in the next ten years.  And, like it or not, whatever else Microsoft did that was crummy and evil, they never told a developer he couldn’t distribute an app.

Let’s face it.  If you can support selling 5 GB downloads (which Apple does in the form of movies) through your e-commerce solution, iTunes, then there’s certainly no intrinsic barrier to doing so with applications, or drivers, or other forms of digital content.  If we fail to think of applications as content, we fail in our understanding of content.   Yet here we are thinking it’s a bold new idea to license and sell application software online–fully confining the novelty of such a thing to the mobile space.   Heh, we’re smart.

An old friend, Fleecy Moss, who was among the architects of the independent takeover of Amiga in the early 2000′s, once gave a talk at a tradeshow in the nineties–and his espousal of the content designation to software was, at the time, a revolutionary concept.  As with many ideas that bubbled up from the ill-fated Amiga wellspring, this concept proved true, and was ahead of its time.  It would be another ten years before the idea was accepted by the greater community.

The app store paradigm has brought this idea to the forefront of the way we think about distributing content.  Yet there’s something holding up the adoption of online app stores to distribute software, and I can’t quite thumb it.  Shareware authors have been distributing license credentials through e-commerce sites for a decade already, yet Apple and Microsoft still don’t sell their developers’ software through their flagship web sites.

Perhaps even more silly is the fact that consumers, vis-a-vis bloggers, don’t already demand such a solution.  If I can buy and download a DRM’d episode of Lost, why can’t I download a credentialed, licensed copy of Squeeze, or Microsoft Office for Mac, or my favorite blogging application, Ecto?   Yet nobody complains.  Indeed, it seems that the idea of a desktop app store is some kind of new idea. Technologizer, the “smarter take on tech”, just ran a piece about it today.   Yet I was talking about it a year ago, and longer.